NT/2000下不消驱动的Ring0代码实现
副标题#e#
各人知道,Windows NT/2000为实现其靠得住性,严格将系统分别为内核模式与用户模式,在i386系统中别离对应CPU的Ring0与Ring3级别。Ring0下,可以执行特权级指令,对任何I/O设备都有会见权等等。要实现从用户态进入焦点态,即从Ring 3进入Ring 0必需借助CPU的某种门机制,如间断门、挪用门等。而Windows NT/2000提供用户态执行系统处事(Ring 0例程)的此类机制即System Service的int 2eh间断处事等,严格的参数查抄,只能严格的执行Windows NT/2000提供的处事,而假如想执行用户提供的Ring 0代码(指运行在Ring 0权限的代码),通例要领好像只有编写设备驱动措施。本文将先容一种在用户态不借助任何驱动措施执行Ring0代码的要领。
Windows NT/2000将设备驱动措施调入内核区域(常见的位于地点0x80000000上),由DPL为0的GDT项8,即cs为8时实现Ring 0权限。本文通过在系统中结构一个指向我们的代码的挪用门(CallGate),实现Ring0代码。基于这个思路,为实现这个目标主要是结构本身的CallGate。CallGate由系统中叫Global Descriptor Table(GDT)的全局表指定。GDT地点可由i386指令sgdt得到(sgdt不是特权级指令,普通Ring 3措施均可执行)。GDT地点在Windows NT/2000生存于KPCR(Processor Control Region)布局中(见《再谈Windows NT/2000情况切换》)。GDT中的CallGate是如下的名目:
typedef struct
{
unsigned short offset_0_15;
unsigned short selector;
unsigned char param_count : 4;
unsigned char some_bits : 4;
unsigned char type : 4;
unsigned char app_system : 1;
unsigned char dpl : 2;
unsigned char present : 1;
unsigned short offset_16_31;
} CALLGATE_DESCRIPTOR;
GDT位于内核区域,一般用户态的措施是不行能对这段内存区域有直接的会见权。幸运的是Windows NT/2000提供了一个叫PhysicalMemory的Section内核工具位于\Device的路径下。顾名思义,通过这个Section工具可以对物理内存举办操纵。用objdir.exe对这个工具阐明如下:
C:\NTDDK\bin>objdir /D \Device
PhysicalMemory
Section
DACL -
Ace[ 0] - Grant - 0xf001f - NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
Inherit:
Access: 0x001F and ( D RCtl WOwn WDacl )
Ace[ 1] - Grant - 0x2000d - BUILTIN\Administrators
Inherit:
Access: 0x000D and ( RCtl )
从dump出的这个工具DACL的Ace可以看出默认环境下只有SYSTEM用户才有对这个工具的读写权限,即对物理内存有读写本领,而Administrator只有读权限,普通用户基础就没有权限。不外假如我们有Administrator权限就可以通过GetSecurityInfo、SetEntriesInAcl与SetSecurityInfo这些API来修改这个工具的ACE。这也是我提供的代码需要Administrator的原因。实现的代码如下:
VOID SetPhyscialMemorySectionCanBeWrited(HANDLE hSection)
{
PACL pDacl=NULL;
PACL pNewDacl=NULL;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSD=NULL;
DWORD dwRes;
EXPLICIT_ACCESS ea;
if(dwRes=GetSecurityInfo(hSection,SE_KERNEL_OBJECT,DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
NULL,NULL,&pDacl,NULL,&pSD)!=ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
printf( "GetSecurityInfo Error %u\n", dwRes );
goto CleanUp;
}
ZeroMemory(&ea, sizeof(EXPLICIT_ACCESS));
ea.grfAccessPermissions = SECTION_MAP_WRITE;
ea.grfAccessMode = GRANT_ACCESS;
ea.grfInheritance= NO_INHERITANCE;
ea.Trustee.TrusteeForm = TRUSTEE_IS_NAME;
ea.Trustee.TrusteeType = TRUSTEE_IS_USER;
ea.Trustee.ptstrName = "CURRENT_USER";
if(dwRes=SetEntriesInAcl(1,&ea,pDacl,&pNewDacl)!=ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
printf( "SetEntriesInAcl %u\n", dwRes );
goto CleanUp;
}
if(dwRes=SetSecurityInfo(hSection,SE_KERNEL_OBJECT,DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
NULL,NULL,pNewDacl,NULL)!=ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
printf("SetSecurityInfo %u\n",dwRes);
goto CleanUp;
}
CleanUp:
if(pSD)
LocalFree(pSD);
if(pNewDacl)
LocalFree(pSD);
}
这段代码对给定HANDLE的工具增加了如下的ACE:
PhysicalMemory
Section
DACL -
Ace[ 0] - Grant - 0x2 - WEBCRAZY\Administrator
Inherit:
Access: 0x0002 //SECTION_MAP_WRITE
#p#副标题#e#
这样我们在有Administrator权限的条件下就有了对物理内存的读写本领。但若要修改GDT表实现Ring 0代码。我们将面对着另一个困难,因为sgdt指令得到的GDT地点是虚拟地点(线性地点),我们只有知道GDT表的物理地点后才气通过\Device\PhysicalMemory工具修改GDT表,这就牵涉到了线性地点转化成物理地点的问题。我们先来看一看Windows NT/2000是如何实现这个的:
kd> u nt!MmGetPhysicalAddress l 30
ntoskrnl!MmGetPhysicalAddress:
801374e0 56 push esi
801374e1 8b742408 mov esi,[esp+0x8]
801374e5 33d2 xor edx,edx
801374e7 81fe00000080 cmp esi,0x80000000
801374ed 722c jb ntoskrnl!MmGetPhysicalAddress+0x2b (8013751b)
801374ef 81fe000000a0 cmp esi,0xa0000000
801374f5 7324 jnb ntoskrnl!MmGetPhysicalAddress+0x2b (8013751b)
801374f7 39153ce71780 cmp [ntoskrnl!MmKseg2Frame (8017e73c)],edx
801374fd 741c jz ntoskrnl!MmGetPhysicalAddress+0x2b (8013751b)
801374ff 8bc6 mov eax,esi
80137501 c1e80c shr eax,0xc
80137504 25ffff0100 and eax,0x1ffff
80137509 6a0c push 0xc
8013750b 59 pop ecx
8013750c e8d3a7fcff call ntoskrnl!_allshl (80101ce4)
80137511 81e6ff0f0000 and esi,0xfff
80137517 03c6 add eax,esi
80137519 eb17 jmp ntoskrnl!MmGetPhysicalAddress+0x57 (80137532)
8013751b 8bc6 mov eax,esi
8013751d c1e80a shr eax,0xa
80137520 25fcff3f00 and eax,0x3ffffc
80137525 2d00000040 sub eax,0x40000000
8013752a 8b00 mov eax,[eax]
8013752c a801 test al,0x1
8013752e 7506 jnz ntoskrnl!MmGetPhysicalAddress+0x44 (80137536)
80137530 33c0 xor eax,eax
80137532 5e pop esi
80137533 c20400 ret 0x4
#p#分页标题#e#
从这段汇编代码可看出假如线性地点在0x80000000与0xa0000000范畴内,只是简朴的举办移位操纵(位于801374ff-80137519指令间),并未查页表。我想Microsoft这样布置必定是出于执行效率的思量。这也为我们指明白一线曙光,因为GDT表在Windows NT/2000中一般环境下均位于这个区域(我不知道/3GB开关的Windows NT/2000是不是这种环境)。
颠末这样的阐明,我们就可以只通过用户态措施修改GDT表了。而增加一个CallGate就不是我可以先容的了,找本Intel手册本身看一看了。详细实现代码如下:
typedef struct gdtr {
short Limit;
short BaseLow;
short BaseHigh;
} Gdtr_t, *PGdtr_t;
ULONG MiniMmGetPhysicalAddress(ULONG virtualaddress)
{
if(virtualaddress<0x80000000||virtualaddress>=0xA0000000)
return 0;
return virtualaddress&0x1FFFF000;
}
BOOL ExecRing0Proc(ULONG Entry,ULONG seglen)
{
Gdtr_t gdt;
__asm sgdt gdt;
ULONG mapAddr=MiniMmGetPhysicalAddress(gdt.BaseHigh<<16U|gdt.BaseLow);
if(!mapAddr) return 0;
HANDLE hSection=NULL;
NTSTATUS status;
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES objectAttributes;
UNICODE_STRING objName;
CALLGATE_DESCRIPTOR *cg;
status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
RtlInitUnicodeString(&objName,L"\\Device\\PhysicalMemory");
InitializeObjectAttributes(&objectAttributes,
&objName,
OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE,
NULL,
(PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) NULL);
status = ZwOpenSection(&hSection,SECTION_MAP_READ|SECTION_MAP_WRITE,
&objectAttributes);
if(status == STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED){
status = ZwOpenSection(&hSection,READ_CONTROL|WRITE_DAC
,&objectAttributes);
SetPhyscialMemorySectionCanBeWrited(hSection);
ZwClose(hSection);
status =ZwOpenSection(&hSection,SECTION_MAP_WRITE|SECTION_MAP_WRITE,
&objectAttributes);
}
if(status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
printf("Error Open PhysicalMemory Section Object,Status:%08X\n",status);
return 0;
}
PVOID BaseAddress;
BaseAddress=MapViewOfFile(hSection,
FILE_MAP_READ|FILE_MAP_WRITE,
0,
mapAddr, //low part
(gdt.Limit+1));
if(!BaseAddress)
{
printf("Error MapViewOfFile:");
PrintWin32Error(GetLastError());
return 0;
}
BOOL setcg=FALSE;
for(cg=(CALLGATE_DESCRIPTOR *)((ULONG)BaseAddress+(gdt.Limit&0xFFF8));
(ULONG)cg>(ULONG)BaseAddress;cg--)
if(cg->type == 0){
cg->offset_0_15 = LOWORD(Entry);
cg->selector = 8;
cg->param_count = 0;
cg->some_bits = 0;
cg->type = 0xC; // 386 call gate
cg->app_system = 0; // A system descriptor
cg->dpl = 3; // Ring 3 code can call
cg->present = 1;
cg->offset_16_31 = HIWORD(Entry);
setcg=TRUE;
break;
}
if(!setcg){
ZwClose(hSection);
return 0;
}
short farcall[3];
farcall[2]=((short)((ULONG)cg-(ULONG)BaseAddress))|3; //Ring 3 callgate;
if(!VirtualLock((PVOID)Entry,seglen))
{
printf("Error VirtualLock:");
PrintWin32Error(GetLastError());
return 0;
}
SetThreadPriority(GetCurrentThread(),THREAD_PRIORITY_TIME_CRITICAL);
Sleep(0);
_asm call fword ptr [farcall]
SetThreadPriority(GetCurrentThread(),THREAD_PRIORITY_NORMAL);
VirtualUnlock((PVOID)Entry,seglen);
//Clear callgate
*(ULONG *)cg=0;
*((ULONG *)cg+1)=0;
ZwClose(hSection);
return TRUE;
}
#p#分页标题#e#
我在提供的代码中演示了对Control Register与I/O端口的操纵。CIH病毒在Windows 9X中就是因为得到Ring 0权限才有了必然的危害,但Windows NT/2000究竟不是Windows 9X,她已经有了较量多的安详审核机制,本文提供的代码也要求具有Administrator权限,但假如系统存在某种裂痕,如缓冲区溢出等等,照旧有大概得到这种权限的,所以我差池本文提供的要领负有任何的责任,所有接头只是一个技能热爱者在接头技能罢了。感谢!
参考资料:
1.Intel Corp<<Intel Architecture Software Developer’s Manual,Volume 3>>